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Abstract 
A  key  feature  of  hydrologically  connected  surface  and  groundwater  stocks  is  the  two-way 
exchange  of  water  between  the  systems.  Increasing  water  scarcity,  particularly  in  arid 
environments, has spurred debate on how to coordinate management of the two resources. In this 
paper,  I  present  a  model  that  describes  the  dynamic  feedback  loop  between  surface  and 
groundwater systems when economic agents withdraw water from both for use in production. I 
use the model to describe optimal water extraction from both stocks and to evaluate how a 
conjunctive management policy shifts welfare between surface and groundwater user groups. 
Finally, I explore the importance of accounting for two-way feedback between the two stocks, 
when it exists, in estimating the benefits to a conjunctive management system. I estimate that the 
returns to conjunctive management in a closed system are greater than 6.5 times that in a system 













Historically, property rights for surface and groundwater on the Snake Plain in Idaho have been 
allocated  and  administered  independently.  Dwindling  water  supplies  and  the  adoption  of 
increasingly  efficient  irrigation  technologies  reveal  that  the  two  resources  are  more 
interdependent  than  previously  thought:  Not  only  does  the  surface  water  stock  recharge  the 
groundwater  stock,  but  the  groundwater  stock  also  replenishes  the  surface  water  stock  via 
discharge.  This  two-way  exchange  of  water  between  the  systems  is  a  key  feature  of 
hydrologically  connected  regions  worldwide.  However,  the  implications  of  hydrologic 
connectivity for efficient water management at a regional scale remain largely unexplored in the 
economic literature.   
In this paper, I present a general model that describes the dynamic feedback loop between 
linked surface and groundwater systems when economic agents withdraw water from both for 
irrigation. I use the model to describe the long-run equilibrium rates of surface water diversions 
and  groundwater  pumping  under  differing  management  and  hydrologic  assumptions.  The 
management regimes examined include a system in which the groundwater and surface water 
stocks are managed by independent social planners and a system of conjunctive management, in 
which both resources are managed by a single social planner. I further examine the differences 
between independent and conjunctive management regimes under the assumption that surface 
and groundwater systems are characterized best by significant recharge but minimal discharge 
(an “open” system).  
In  the  context  of  a  numerical  simulation,  I  demonstrate  that  there  is  a  substantial 
difference in the outcomes under independent versus conjunctive management in the case when 
the  surface  and  groundwater  systems  are  hydrologically  connected.  In  an  open  system,  the 
returns to conjunctive management (over independent management of the two stocks) are slim, a 3 
 
result that is broadly consistent with the Gisser-Sanchez effect (1980). However, when the full 
feedback between ground and surface water stocks is incorporated into the model, the returns to 
conjunctive management exceed the returns in an open system by over 6.5 times. The results 
highlight the importance of accounting for the closed feedback loop between water stocks when 
evaluating the returns to a conjunctive management policy. 
That  conjunctive  management  yields  positive  returns  in  a  hydrologically  connected 
region like the Snake Plain is likely not surprising to the region’s water policymakers.
1 Of late, 
the  movement  of  water  from  the  groundwater  to  the  surface  water  stock  has  become  an 
increasingly pressing policy issue. As aquifer levels have declined due to a variety of factors, 
discharge to the surface water stock has also decreased, reducing surface water flows. Generally, 
surface  water  rights  are  legally  senior  to  groundwater  rights  per  the  doctrine  of  Prior 
Appropriation.  Over  the  past  decade,  surface  water  rights  holders  have  initiated  a  spate  of 
ongoing lawsuits demanding that junior groundwater users cease pumping until surface water 
supplies are sufficiently replenished to satisfy surface rights entitlements.  
  To date, the state has  been reticent  to  curtail  groundwater pumping for a number of 
reasons,  foremost  of  which  is  the  fact  that  the  majority  of  the  highest-value  agricultural 
production in the Snake Plain is dependent upon access to groundwater. The costs associated 
with curtailing groundwater rights are expected to far exceed the long-term stream of benefits 
from ensuring adequate surface water supplies. Consequently, the state has yet to rigorously and 
consistently apply Prior Appropriation across surface and groundwater user groups.  
While the legal issues associated with linked ground and surface water supplies have 
spurred a shift in policy towards conjunctive (or integrated) management of the two resources, 
                                                 
1  A  stakeholder  stated,  during  the  course  of  a  conversation  about  this  project,  that  estimating  the  returns  to 
conjunctive management seems like an “academic exercise” given that the state will ultimately institute a system of 
conjunctive management, having already recognized the benefits to doing so, if only anecdotally.   4 
 
the appropriate design of a conjunctive management policy and the distribution effects of any 
such measure remain uncertain. This analysis examines the optimal conjunctive management 
strategy  without  imposing  the  constraints  required  by  uniform  enforcement  of  Prior 
Appropriation  doctrine.  Although  operating  outside  of  the  traditional  system  of  water  rights 
enforcement  may  ultimately  prove  politically  unpalatable,  this  study  comments  on  the 
distributional impacts of a first-best conjunctive management policy. 
 
Relevant Literature 
Work  by  Gisser  and  Sanchez  (1980)  spurred  a  large  literature  investigating  the  returns  to 
centralized  management  of  a  renewable  groundwater  resource.  Their  study  departs  from  the 
premise that groundwater is an exclusive, not open access, resource. Under this assumption, they 
compare  the  time  paths  of  withdrawals  and  the  evolution  of  the  groundwater  stock  under 
competitive pumping with the outcome under management by a forward-looking social planner. 
Using parameters based on the Pecos Basin in New Mexico, the authors find that the difference 
between competitive and optimal control outcomes is negligible for relatively large aquifers. 
Their concluding assertion that “the economic profession would benefit more from estimating 
economic and hydrologic parameters than from further discussing optimal control schemes for 
groundwater management” (641) has, understandably, generated a great deal of discussion in the 
economic literature over the past three decades. 
  The vein of literature most relevant to this study is that which explores the returns to 
managing  linked  surface  and  groundwater  resources.  Burt  (1964,  1966)  treats  groundwater 
recharge as dependent upon stochastic precipitation and surface water flows. Similarly, Tsur and 
Graham-Tomasi (1991) and Provencher and Burt (1993) look at the value of groundwater as a 5 
 
buffer to uncertainty in the surface water stock. Knapp and Olson (1994) examine intentional 
groundwater recharge in years with higher than average surface water supplies. These studies 
similarly consider systems that are linked only via recharge. In all, they find that groundwater 
possesses value as a buffer against stochastic surface water flows. Knapp and Olson conclude 
that optimal conjunctive management of linked surface and groundwater systems yields a low 
level of benefits, a result consistent with the Gisser-Sanchez effect.  
  In an extensive literature review on the subject, Koundouri (2004) notes that Burness and 
Martin (1988) is one of the first to explicitly model the two-way feedback between surface and 
groundwater  systems.  Their  study  documents  that  groundwater  pumping  imposes  a  negative 
externality  upon  those  dependent  on  surface  water  flows  via  “river  effects”,  or  discharge. 
However,  they  do  not  estimate  the  returns  to  conjunctive  management  under  these 
circumstances.  Koundouri  further  notes  that  “there  exists  no  literature  on  models  focusing 
primarily  on  the  hydrologic  link  between  ground  and  surface  water  and  at  the  same  time 
acknowledging the stochastic nature of surface water supplies” (712). The review suggests that 
incorporating  the  full  feedback  between  surface  and  groundwater  systems  may  increase  the 
returns to conjunctive groundwater management, and that incorporating the stochastic nature of 
surface water supplies may further increase the estimated returns (perhaps even more so when 
irrigators are risk-averse). 
  Burness and Martin (1988) present an analytical model of the decline in the surface water 
stock resulting from a drawdown in the groundwater table. Per basic hydrology, groundwater 
pumping  reduces  the  water  table,  reducing  hydrostatic  pressure  between  the  stream  and  the 
groundwater stock, causing a greater amount of surface water to be drawn into the aquifer. To 
simplify the analysis sufficiently, they assume no return flows, natural recharge, or fluctuations 6 
 
in the surface water stock. Under these assumptions, they find that the time path of pumping 
involves monotonically decreasing pumping rates which eventually converge to a steady state. 
They remark that this differs substantially from the standard case in which pumping is constant 
over time.  
  This study expands upon the previous literature by explicitly incorporating the welfare of 
both  surface  and  groundwater  users  into  a  model  of  water  management  in  a  hydrologically 
connected region. The model formulation is similar to many in the literature in its use of optimal 
control  theory  to  conceptualize  the  dynamic  optimization  problem.  Further,  it  takes  an 
aggregated  approach  to  the  problem,  examining  returns  to  management  across  surface  and 
groundwater user groups. Adopting a modeling approach similar to that literature spurred by 
Gisser  and  Sanchez  (1980)  facilitates  a  comparison  of  the  results  herein  with  those  in  the 
previous  literature.  Thus,  this  analysis  can  comment  on  the  importance  of  incorporating 
hydrologic connectivity into a model of water management. 
 
An Optimal Control Model of Water Management 
In any period, precipitation enters the surface water system. Herein, I assume that precipitation is 
exogenous and that the hydrological system is closed to other types of inflows and outflows. I 
denote  precipitation-driven  natural  recharge  to  the  surface  water  system  Rt.  Two  variables 
describe the state of the surface and groundwater systems at a point in time:  St denotes the 
amount of water in the surface water system, and Ht measures the elevation of the groundwater 
table above sea level. The subscript t indexes time period. 
Inflows into the surface water stock come from precipitation and discharge, the process 
whereby groundwater moves from a hydrologically linked aquifer into the surface water stock 7 
 
via springs and seeps. The surface water stock loses water each period to recharge, which occurs 
when surface water percolates  into the groundwater stock. Recharge  and discharge are each 
defined as a proportional amount of the originating stock. They are, respectively,  S   and  . H  If 
there are no withdrawals for irrigation, the equation-of-motion for the surface water stock is:  
(1)  . t t t t H S R S        
Similarly, the equation-of-motion describing the change in the water table is  
(2)  . t t t H S H AS        
Expression (2) is similar to the equation-of-motion used by Gisser and Sanchez (1980), where 
inflows and outflows affect the water table by changing the volume of water in the aquifer. As in 
their analysis, AS is the area times the specific yield (or “storativity”) of the aquifer. In (2), 
recharge from the surface water stock,  , S   plays the role of exogenous natural recharge, R. This 
equation-of-motion presumes a single-cell aquifer (with vertical sides) in which lateral flow is 
transmitted instantaneously. 
  To incorporate irrigator withdrawals, I define two control variables: Wt, which denotes 
withdrawals for irrigation from the surface water system in each period, and Mt, which denotes 
groundwater  pumping  in  each  period.  I  assume  that  water  from  either  source  is  a  perfect 
substitute  in  irrigation.
2  Whenever irrigation water is applied to the land surface, a certain 
amount of the total is consumed by the plant and leaves  the system via evapotranspiration. The 
remainder, termed return flows, re-enters the stock. I assume for simplicity that the return flows 
arising from irrigation use from either system return to the system from which they were 
                                                 
2 This is reasonable if the water is used for crop production or stockwater. In the case of aquaculture this assumption 
is not reasonable. Aquaculture in Idaho relies predominantly on groundwater-fed springs, which emit water at a 
temperature appropriate for trout production. Much of the conflict between  surface and groundwater  users  has 
actually been due to water shortages for aquaculture producers, who hold surface water rights. The linkage between 
the height of the groundwater table and the amount of water exiting springs is particularly transparent in this case. 8 
 
withdrawn. This assumption is appropriate when groundwater is used on land more distant from 
the surface water system (and water from surface water withdrawals is used on land adjacent to 
surface water bodies or irrigation canals). I model return flows as a constant proportion, γ, of the 
water withdrawn for irrigation. 
With irrigation withdrawals, the equations-of-motion become 
(3)    t t t t t W H S R S 1           and 
(4)    t t t t M H S H AS 1            
Equation-of-motion  (4)  differs  from  that  used  by  Gisser  and  Sanchez  because  it  accounts 
explicitly for the effect of the surface water stock on the groundwater table. Moreover, the rate of 
change in the groundwater table depends on its level in period t, which determines the amount of 
discharge lost to the surface water stock. Equation-of-motion (3), which is not typically included 
in  groundwater  allocation  models,  highlights  the  way  in  which  the  surface  water  stock 
determines  transfers  to  the  groundwater  stock  via  recharge  and,  conversely,  the  water  table 
determines the rate at which the groundwater stock replenishes the surface. 
  I  continue  to  follow  Gisser  and  Sanchez  in  constructing  the  economic  optimization 
problem.  I  begin  by  treating  the  groundwater  and  surface  water  stocks  as  though  they  are 
managed separately by distinct social planners. This abstracts away from the behavior of the 
individual decision-maker. It is consistent with the way in which groundwater and surface water 
is currently administered to assume that, at a system level, the amount of water that may be 
extracted  from  either  system  is  capped.
3  In  this  scenario ,  strategic  externalities  between 
individual users within a larger group are limited. While cost externalities may still exist among 
groundwater  users  in  the  sense  that  one  user’s  withdrawals  may  lower  the  water  table  and 
                                                 
3 Limiting the rate of withdrawal for groundwater rights holders is one major objective of the Snake River water 
rights adjudication process. 9 
 
increase another user’s costs of extraction, the adjudication process for water rights provides a 
means  for  individuals  to  address  personal  harm  caused  by  another’s  extractions.  Given  that 
individuals have legal recourse and that the total amount of withdrawals has been constrained by 
a central authority, I assume that externalities between individual water users within a group are 
negligible, particularly relative to the scale of the entire system.  
  However, the model does permit the potential for externalities to arise between aggregate 
surface and groundwater user groups, as has been the case to date on the Snake Plain. While the 
adjudication  process  separately  specified  the  amount  of  water  allocated  to  surface  and 
groundwater users, the specification of rights has never explicitly recognized the potential for 
negative impacts by one user group on the other. I model the two systems as though a distinct 
planner administers each stock independently. The two planners seek to maximize the returns to 
each  user  group,  but  do  not  engage  in  a  strategic  game  with  the  other  planner  (a  tenable 
assumption if the two planners are housed within the same government agency, such as the Idaho 
Department  of  Water  Resources).  Thus,  each  planner  chooses  a  long-term  plan  of  resource 
extraction that maximizes the net benefits to irrigation water users across a single group.  
  To construct the economic optimization problem, I specify separate demand and water 
cost functions for surface and groundwater users. The demand functions are  mP h W    and 
kP g M     for  surface  and  groundwater,  respectively.  The  cost  functions  are  given  by 
cW Csw   and    . M bH a Cgw    The marginal cost of groundwater pumping depends on the 
depth  of  the  water  table.  For  simplicity,  I  assume  that  the  marginal  cost  of  surface  water 
diversions is constant and does not depend on the total amount of water in the surface water 
system. This assumption may be untenable during periods with severely low surface flows.  
 10 
 
An Open System 
I first consider the case in which the surface water stock recharges the groundwater stock, but 
there  is  no  significant  movement  of  water  from  the  groundwater  to  the  surface  stock  via 
discharge. In this case, equations (3) and (4) are modified: 
(3′)    t t t t W S R S 1          and 
(4′)    . 1 t t t M S H AS         





















subject to (3′) and standard non-negativity constraints. Setting up the Hamiltonian and using the 
first-order conditions yields a system of two first-order differential equations: 
(5s)       cm h r W r W          and 
(6s)    . 1W S R S       
 
Similarly, the groundwater planner faces the problem  
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subject  to  (4′) and standard non-negativity  constraints.  These conditions  yield  the system  of 
differential equations 
(5g)    ak g r S
AS
bk
rbkH rM M     
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The  conjunctive  manager  maximizes  the  unweighted  sum  of  producer  surplus  across 
surface and groundwater users subject to constraints (3′) and (4′), which yields the system of four 
differential equations: 
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(6j.1)    , 1W S R S         and 













Comparing (5j.1) with (5s), the rate of change in surface withdrawals is increasing in the 
groundwater table and decreasing in the amount of groundwater withdrawals in the conjunctive 
management system (5j.1), while neither groundwater withdrawals nor the groundwater table 
affect the level of withdrawals in (5s). In contrast, the rate of groundwater pumping in (5j.2) is 
identical to that in (5g). In either case, the groundwater planner recognizes the influence of the 
surface  water  stock  on  recharge  and  the  groundwater  table.  Because  water  moves  between 
systems  in  only  one  direction,  the  decisions  governing  groundwater  use  in  the  conjunctive 
system are identical to that in the non-conjunctive management system. Based on this result, the 
benefit  to  groundwater  users,  in  particular,  of  engaging  in  conjunctive  management  is only 
derived indirectly via the effect of conjunctive management on the surface water stock and the 
rate of recharge.  
A  convenient  means  of  analyzing  the  difference  in  outcomes  under  independent  and 
conjunctive management is by examining the steady-state levels of withdrawals and stocks, if the 12 
 
parameters of the problem ensure a steady-state exists. Table 1 presents the steady state solutions 
under the two management regimes in an open system. If it is the case that 
(i)    , 1 cm h R        
then a positive steady-state value for surface water withdrawals and groundwater withdrawals 
exists under a conjunctive management regime. Condition (i) implies that precipitation coming 
into the system is sufficient to replace the proportion of surface water demanded (under perfect 
competition) that is lost due to evapotranspiration. 
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The  difference  in  surface  water  withdrawals  under  independent  and  conjunctive 
management is given by 
          . 1
1
* *
, , R cm h
bm r rAS
bm






Under  condition  (7),  . * *
, , O CM O IP W W    It  follows  that  * *
, , O CM O IP M M    and  . * *
, , O CM O IP S S    The 
steady-state  solution  also  reveals  that  the  water  table  is  always  higher  under  a  system  of 
conjunctive  management  than  under  the  independent  planner  regime,  holding  W*  constant. 
Under condition (i), the reduction in surface water diversions under conjunctive management 
reinforces  the  water  table  effect,  further  increasing  the  level  of  the  water  table  over  the 
independent planner case. Thus, conjunctive management in an open system involves decreasing 
surface diversions. Doing so increases the water table by boosting recharge and by increasing the 
amount of groundwater pumped in each period. The returns to conjunctive management decrease 
with increases in the size of the aquifer, a result consistent with  the findings of Gisser and 
Sanchez (1980). 
 
A Closed System 
The closed system problem differs from the open system problem in its inclusion of discharge in 
the equations of motion. The surface water planner’s problem is defined by the two conditions 
(7s)      W r cm h r W           and 
(8s)    . 1W H S R S         
 
where the latter corresponds to equation (3) and the equations are derived from the first-order 
conditions for optimization. The groundwater planner’s problem is defined by the system  14 
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   
 
Condition  (7g)  differs  from  condition  (5g)  in  that  the  groundwater  planner  faces  a 
different effective discount rate. Specifically, when discharge is included in the problem, the 
groundwater planner faces a discount rate that includes the rate at which the value of pumped 
groundwater decays into the future (r) and the rate at which the groundwater table declines due 
to recharge (β/AS). 
The conjunctive manager’s problem is given by the system of four differential equations 
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(8j.1)    , 1W H S R S           and 












   
 
Equation (7j.1) is identical to that in the open system (5j.1). The primary difference between the 
two conjunctive management systems is the difference between (7j.2) and (5j.2). The former 
explicitly accounts for the impact of surface water withdrawals when determining the optimal 
rate of groundwater pumping. Moreover, the optimal rate of groundwater pumping depends on 
the parameters of the surface water demand function. 
Comparing the steady-state solutions implied by the independent planner and conjunctive 
management problems is once again informative, though more complex than in the case of an 
open system. Table 2 presents the steady state solutions under the two management regimes in an 15 
 
open  system.  Under  an  independent  planner,  the  withdrawal  rates  for  both  surface  and 
groundwater are identical to those in the open system. The stock levels, however, differ due to 
the exchange of water from the ground to the surface water stock.  
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If it is the case that 
(ii)    , 1 cm h R         
then  a  positive  steady-state  value  for  surface  and  groundwater  withdrawals  exists  under  a 
conjunctive management regime. Condition (ii) is less straightforward to interpret than condition 
(i): The precipitation coming into the system must be sufficient to replace the proportion of 
surface  water  demanded  (under  perfect  competition)  that  is  lost  from  the  system  due  to 
evapotranspiration times the recharge coefficient. Because  1    condition (ii) is less stringent 
than condition (i), i.e. there exists a steady-state for a larger range of precipitation values in a 
closed than in an open system.  
Under condition (ii), it is straightforward to verify that   , * *
, , C CM C IP W W    , * *
, , C CM C IP M M   
* *
, , C CM C IP S S   and  . * *
, , C CM C IP H H   Because of the complexity of the analytical solutions, I further 
explore the differences in the returns to conjunctive management in an open and closed system 
using  a  simple  numerical  example  that  draws  on  the  parameter  values  used  by  Gisser  and 
Sanchez.  The  parameters  of  the  problem  and  the  steady-state  solutions  under  different 
hydrological assumptions and management regimes are reported in Table 3.  
 
Table 3. Parameter values and steady-state numerical solutions 
Parameter Values 
Gisser and Sanchez (1980)  Additional assumptions 
r  0.10  a  125  h  470,365  R  450,000 
g  470,365  b  -0.035  m  -3,259  α  0.27 
K  -3,259  AS  135,000  c  0.035  β  0.15 
(γ-1)  -0.73             
 
Management System, Hydrologic Assumption 
  Indep., Open  Conj., Open  Indep., Closed  Conj., Closed 
Surface diversions (W*)  470,251  469,590  470,251  468,045 
Groundwater pumping (M*)  146,187  146,848  146,187  148,393 
Surface stock (S*)  395,248  397,035  395,248  401,211 
Water table height (H*)  737  743  737  775 17 
 
Without quantifying the monetary stream of benefits into the future, Table 3 indicates 
that the benefits to conjunctive management in a closed system, and the corresponding welfare 
distribution,  are  different  than  in  an  open  system.  While  there  is  a  greater  reduction  in  the 
amount of water diverted from the surface water system than in the conjunctive/open case, the 
amount of  groundwater pumping is  much larger in  the conjunctive/closed case.  Further, the 
amount of water in the surface stock and the height of the water table significantly exceed that 
under  the  conjunctive/open  solution.  In  a  closed  system,  the  results  suggest  that  optimal 
management necessarily redistributes welfare from surface to groundwater users, concerns about 
weighting the social welfare function aside. 
Under the assumed parameters, the returns to conjunctive management in a closed system 
are over 6.5 times as great as those in an open system. A change in any factor that tends to 
increase the returns to conjunctive management in an open system, such as those demonstrated 
by Feinerman and Knapp (1983), will only tend to further augment the returns to conjunctive 
management in a closed system. Interestingly, the solutions are insensitive to even substantial 
changes in the rate of discharge from the ground to the surface water system. Continuing work in 
the immediate future will involve testing the sensitivity of the model results to other parameters. 
The  literature  generally  concurs  that  management  benefits  are  sensitive  to  the  slope  of  the 
demand function and interest rate and moderately sensitive to aquifer size and specific yield 
(Koundouri 2004).  
 
Conclusion 
In a hydrologic system  with  either an open or  a closed  feedback loop  between surface  and 
groundwater stocks, conjunctive management involves a redistribution of welfare from surface 18 
 
water users to groundwater pumpers. A system of conjunctive management requires that surface 
water withdrawals are lower than if surface water is managed by an independent planner. This 
result is perhaps not surprising given that surface water withdrawals impose an externality on 
groundwater users. Specifically, removal of a unit of water from the surface water stock reduces 
the amount of recharge, increasing the marginal pumping cost for groundwater users. However, 
the  removal  of  surface  water  has  a  second-round  impact  that  is  likely  less  recognized  even 
among  surface  water  users  themselves:  Reducing  the  surface  water  stock  by  a  unit  today 
decreases recharge, lowering the water table, and reducing future discharge back into the surface 
water stock. Thus, under a conjunctive management policy, the shadow value of a unit of surface 
water in situ incorporates the impact of removing a unit on both recharge and future discharge.   
  This analysis suggests that a first-best system of conjunctive management may imply 
much  larger  welfare  gains  over  the  long-run  than  the  groundwater  management  literature 
suggests. This result is driven by the closed feedback loop between the surface and groundwater 
stocks.  Future  analysis  will  explore  the  sensitivity  of  this  result  to  changes  in  the  model’s 
parameters and to conditions specific to the Snake Plain in Idaho. A limitation of this analysis is 
the assumption throughout that policymakers place equal weight on surface and groundwater 
users’ welfare. While inconsistent with the doctrine of Prior Appropriation, strictly interpreted, 
this  assumption  is  borne  out  to  date  in  the  reticence  of  policymakers  to  curtail  junior 
groundwater users. Whether a system of conjunctive management like the one examined here is 
politically viable is uncertain. The gains to conjunctive management may be significantly lower 
than those estimated here if state water planners must operate within the confines of traditional 
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